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THE PUBLIC DISPOSITION OF RESTRICTED
SECURITIES AND OF SECURITIES HELD
BY CONTROLLING PERSONS-THE
WHEAT REPORT, SEC PROPOSED
RULE 144 AND THE SEARCH
FOR CERTAINTY*
MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ---
In an attempt to eliminate uncertainty as to the application of
statutory requirements to dispositions of restricted securities, and of
unrestricted securities which are held by controlling persons, the Wheat
Report' and the Securities and Exchange Commission have proposed
rules designed to bring predictability into this area of the federal
securities laws. "Restricted securities" means securities purchased from
the issuer or a person controlling2 the issuer in a so-called non-public
or private offering.3
Persons (controlling or noncontrolling) who hold restricted securi-
ties and controlling persons who hold unrestricted securities may make
resales to the public of their securities only if the securities are regis-
tered under the 1933 Act, or the securities are sold in a transaction
exempt from such registration. The available exemptions are as follows:
(1) the intrastate exemption of section 3(a)(l 1) of the Act;4 (2) the small
This article was completed in April 1971.
** Member, California Bar. B.S., University of California (Berkeley), 1962; LL.B.,
University of California (Berkeley), 1965.
1 SEC, DIscLosuE To INVEsTORs, A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADINIsTRATIW POLICIES
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 AcTs REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECUaRrS AND EXCHANGE
COMiusSiON FRoas THE DiscLosuRE PoLIcy STUDY. (CCH ed. 1969) [hereinafter THE WHEAT
REPORT].
2 This is a shorthand term for a "person directly or indirectly controlling or con-
trolled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the
issuer." Securities Act of 1933, § 2(11), 15 US.C. § 77b(11) (1964).
3 Securities acquired from an issuer in a transaction exempt from registration by
virtue of section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964)- "transactions by an
issuer not involving a public offering" - are of necessity acquired in a non-public or
private offering. Securities acquired from a controlling person in a transaction exempt
from registration by virtue of section 4(1) of the Act- "transactions by any person [eg.,
the controlling person] other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer"- are also acquired
in a non-public or private offering, through a rather tortured but long-honored line of
reasoning, i.e., a controlling person, like any other person, is defined by section 2(11) to
be an underwriter if he participates in an undertaking to sell securities for a controlling
person with a view to distribution. If he sells his own securities he is certainly a partici-
pant in the undertaking to sell securities for a controlling person, namely, himself. The
way to keep out of the definition of underwriter is to prove that there is no distribution.
The word distribution is considered by the SEC to be synonymous with public offering.
Quod erat demonstrandum.
415 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1964).
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offerings exemption provided by section 3(b) - Regulation A;5 (3) the
two exemptions designed primarily for exchanges of securities, sections
3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10);6 and (4) the exemptions most often used - those
found in sections 4(1) and 4(3) of the Act, which are not available to
anyone acting as an underwriter of securities.7 Considerable uncertainty
exists as to the precise definition of an underwriter. The rules proposed
by the Wheat Report, the rules proposed by the Commission on the
basis of that report s and proposed rule 144 9 are designed to give a more
certain definition to this term. Additional uncertainty arises from cer-
tain technical terms and concepts which have been developed in an
effort to impede the flow to the public of restricted securities and securi-
ties held by controlling persons, and the proposed rules attempt to
eliminate this uncertainty.
This article sets forth some of the major areas of uncertainty and
the Wheat Report's response thereto. The rule proposals of that report
and the 160 Series rule proposals of the Commission based upon the
Wheat Report are analyzed and some suggestions for improvement are
made. The sequel to the 160 Series, the Commission's proposed rule 144
is then analyzed in detail in an effort to learn from the few steps forward
and the numerous missteps and steps backward it has taken in the search
for certainty. The overall purpose of this article is to draw together in
one place the train of thought and learning in the search for predict-
ability with respect to the public disposition of restricted securities with
a view to guiding the Commission and interested persons toward the
adoption of a set of rules which will produce the desired certainty.
AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY
The Nebulous Concepts of Investment Intent and Its Offspring: Hold-
ing Period and Change of Circumstances
A person who buys securities from an issuer or controlling person
will be an underwriter if he purchases the securities with a view to a
later distribution of the securities. 10 How can an accurate assessment be
made of a person's view? This depends on his subjective intention or
state of mind at the time he bought the security. If he intended to
purchase the securities for immediate resale, then he purchased with a
view to distribution. If he purchased the securities with the intention
5 Id. § 77c(b).
6ld. § 77c(a)(9),(10).
7 Id. § 77d(l),(3).
8 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969) [hereinafter 160 Series].
9 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970).
10 Securities Act of 1933, § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I1) (1964).
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of holding them, he is said to have purchased them for investment, not
for distribution. The question is whether one has an investment intent
or a distribution intent.
"[S]tate of mind can ordinarily be ascertained only by weighing
evidentiary factors, and ... a person's actions may be of far greater
evidentiary significance than his statements as throwing light on what
his state of mind was at a given time."'" The holding period, that is, the
length of time elapsing between the acquisition of securities and their
proposed sale, was said by the General Counsel of the Commission to be
undoubtedly among the most important evidentiary factors and if the
securities have been held for a sufficiently lengthy period this "fact
would be sufficient, if not contradicted by other evidence, to create a
strong inference that they had been purchased for investment."'1 2 What
is a sufficient holding period to supply the evidence of investment in-
tent?13 In 1938, the General Counsel opined that if the securities were
retained for "as long as a year" that would create the "strong inference"
of investment intent, absent contradictory evidence. 14 In 1957, the
Commission, obviously concerned with the increasing amount of securi-
ties of a speculative nature being sold to the public without registration,
found that "holding for a year, does not afford a statutory basis for an
exemption and therefore does not provide an adequate basis on which
counsel may give opinions or businessmen rely in selling securities with-
out registration."'15 No definite holding period was set forth in this
release. After further ambiguity on the subject 16 some further light was
11 SEC Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938).
12 Id.
13 A related problem is the tacking of holding periods. This uncertainty arises in two
contexts: (1) when there is an involuntary transfer from one person to another by opera-
tion of law, e.g., the termination of a trust, foreclosure by a pledgee, or death; and
(2) voluntary exchange of one security for another by the investor, as in a business
combination or upon conversion of a convertible security. Rule 155 of the General Rules
and Regulations of the SEC under the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.155 (1970), prevents
the tacking of holding periods upon conversion of a convertible security. In other words,
no matter how long the convertible is held, a new holding period commences at the
time of conversion with respect to the security received on conversion. Following this
concept to its logical extreme, rule 155 disallows the public sale of restricted convertible
securities without registration; otherwise, the convertible security could be sold publicly
without registration and the purchaser could convert it without regard to any rule against
tacking.
14 SEC Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938).
15 In re Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
16 The view is occasionally expressed that, solely by reason of continued holding
of a security ... for a year from the date of purchase, the security may be sold
without registration. There is no statutory basis for such assumption. Of course,
the longer the period of retention, the more persuasive would be the argument
that the resale is not at variance with an original investment intent, but the
length of time between acquisition and resale is merely one evidentiary fact to
1971]
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shed when Commissioner (later Chairman) Manuel F. Cohen indicated
that a holding period of more than two years would, with respect to a
person who is not a professional, e.g., a securities dealer, and in the
absence of other circumstances, permit sale of the securities free of
registration.17
There are other indicators of a two-year holding period.'8 However,
it has become increasingly difficult to obtain no-action letters from staff
members of the Commission if the holding period is just two years and
there are no facts indicating change of circumstances. 19 Probably as a
result of the difficulty in obtaining no-action letters immediately after
two years of holding, some authors now report the period may be two to
three years. 20
be considered. The weight to be accorded this evidentiary fact must of necessity,
vary with the circumstances of each case.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). If the holding period is "merely one
evidentiary fact," does the Commission intend to reverse the statement by its General
Counsel in 1938 that a sufficient holding period would establish a "strong inference"
which, if not rebutted by other evidence, would establish investment intent? The
Southern District in New York is of the opinion that a sufficient holding period, e.g., two
years, "'is an insuperable obstacle" to a finding of taking the securities with a view of
distribution, in the absence of any relevant evidence to the contrary. United States v.
Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Perhaps this holding should be
limited to criminal proceedings, particularly since the court noted at the conclusion of
its opinion: "This decision is merely a finding that on this record the prosecution has not
proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused's transactions were violative of the
decree of this court [that the defendant could not sell his shares if a registration statement
should then be required to be filed but not be filed]." Id. at 484.
17 SEC PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERwRITINGS 31 (C. Israels
ed. 1962) [hereinafter SEC PROBLEMS].
18 Form S-14 prescribes a twenty-four month period for keeping prospectuses current
in offerings using that form. See Form S-14, part II, item 6. See also United States v.
Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
19 The author has recently encountered a case where a Commission staff member,
in response to a letter from the issuer regarding proposed sales of formerly restricted
shares by a noncontrolling person, wrote what can be regarded as an action letter, (a
letter stating the staff would recommend action to the Commission if the sales were made
without registration) in regard to a situation where the noncontrolling person (a former
controlling person) had acquired the shares over two years and nine months earlier, and
had suffered serious financial reverses in that time (he lost his job with the issuer and
several of his bank borrowings, in connection with outside investments, were in default)
amounting to a change in circumstances compelling him to sell his shares. Although the
person had sold less than 20 percent of his shares in the two-year and nine-month period,
the sales were all private placements. It is the author's view that the staff member's
position is clearly erroneous. The uncertainty in this area prevents absolute assurance
that the staff member is wrong. The value of a no-action letter is that a court will require
the issuer to transfer the shares if one has been obtained. Kanton v. United States Plastics,
Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965); Petrillo v. Seven Arts Prods. Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP,. 91,921 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967). The weight behind an action letter is unclear;
no court has ever considered the case. It is submitted that no weight should be attached
to it, particularly in cases where the person involved has not had an adequate hearing
before the Commission on the subject of the letter. See generally C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 294 & n.8 (1954).
20 "As a practical matter, the shares may ... be sold in any manner after the lapse of
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It is submitted that the position of the Commission in this area
(which has moved from a one-year holding period to two, and now
perhaps more) whether expressed in no-action or action letters or in
releases is possibly losing the respect to which it should be entitled in
courts called upon to decide cases in this area. A recent case in New
York fortifies the position that approximately a tvo-year holding period
is sufficient.21 It should be remembered that the Commission's pro-
nouncements in this area have not yet amounted to rule-making (except
with respect to rule 154 and certain other rules of a more specialized
nature) and are not conclusive in civil or criminal litigation involving
the sale of unregistered securities. The adoption of rules would do
much to reestablish the Commission's authority in this area, giving
weight in courts to its pronouncements with the desirable side effect of
lending certainty to a very uncertain area of the law.
Another evidentiary fact of investment intent is a change in cir-
cumstances. An unforeseen change of circumstances, which may involve
the circumstances of the issuer or the investor,22 between the date of
purchase and resale may provide a basis for an opinion that the pro-
posed resale is not inconsistent with investment intent.2 3 An attorney
rendering an opinion that restricted securities held by a noncontrolling
person may be sold without registration will usually seek some change
in circumstances which, taken together with the holding period, will
support his opinion. The shorter the holding period (perhaps less than
a year) the more severe and unexpected must be the change, e.g., death,
serious illness requiring immediate funds to provide medical care, seri-
ous financial reverse caused by an unexpected event such as home or
a sufficient amount of time, the period being rather indefinite but probably two to three
years." Schneider, Acquisitions under the Federal Securities Laws-A Program for
Reform, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1323, 1337 (1968).
As a practical matter, holding the investment security for a three year period
results in a presumption that the securities were originally taken for investment.
Persons holding for two years have a fighting chance for a "no-action" letter if
the other circumstances surrounding the transaction indicate an original "invest-
ment" intent. Since the Commission handles each case on an ad hoc basis, no
real rule of thumb is available.
Owen, The Private Offering and Intrastate Exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933,
in SELferCm ARTicL.s ON FEDERAL SEcuRrriEs LAw 165, 170 (H. Wander & W. Grienenberger
eds. 1968).
21 In Leitman v. VTR, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,707 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1970),
the shares were held for twenty-one months which, combined with changed circumstances
(employment terminated, adverse financial conditions), was sufficient for the court to find
that the shares were acquired with an investment intent. Consequently, an injunction was
granted directing the defendants to permit transfer of the shares free of any restrictive
legend on the certificates.
22 Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. Rzv. 851, 855
(1959).
23 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
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investment being destroyed by earthquake or fire. The longer the
holding period (perhaps a year or two years), the less severe need be the
change in circumstances, e.g., loss of job, demand by creditors for pay-
ments on loans not incurred in connection with the purchase of the
securities and threat to declare default if not paid combined with
shrinkage in assets of the debtor and inability to pay without resorting
to sale of his securities, complete change in the nature of the issuer from
a small company to a large conglomerate - in other words a change in
the nature of the investment. After a certain period of time (perhaps
two years plus) no change in circumstances or other evidentiary fact
should be required to establish investment intent unless other facts
which might be taken to indicate an absence of investment intent, such
as a sale by the investment purchaser of a large percentage of his securi-
ties to a large number of persons, require more evidentiary facts on the
investment intent side of the scale to permit sale of the securities with-
out registration. The Commission has published its views as to some
situations not involving change of circumstances, 24 but has done little to
aid in the search for what is a change in circumstances. The fact that it
has not done so is understandable. As found by the Wheat Report, the
change in circumstances test bears no relation to the needs of investors
for adequate disclosure.2 5 Although the investor is broke, this does not
seem to compel the conclusion that the public should not be protected.
Recognizing this paradox, the Commission has not lent its weight to
making the change in circumstances test more certain in application. A
more pragmatic reason for this lies in the bifurcated nature of the Com-
mission as an executive-prosecutorial body as well as a legislative rule-
making body: the Division of Trading and Markets may prefer loose,
uncertain standards to give it freedom of action in enjoining and prose-
cuting violations, while the Division of Corporation Finance would
prefer certain rules of certain application in order to advise issuers,
investors and their counsel as to application of the securities laws and
thereby reduce the heavy volume of requests for no-action letters. 26 A
24 Thus, an advance or decline in market price or a change in the issuer's operating
results are normal investment risks and do not usually provide an acceptable basis
for such claim of changed circumstances. Possible inability of the purchaser to pay
off loans incurred in connection with the purchase of the stock would ordinarily
not be deemed an unforseeable change of circumstances.
Id. The purchase of securities with the intention of retaining them only if the issuer con-
tinues to operate profitably is a purchase with a view to distribution. Thus, the court in
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959), held
there was no change in circumstances when Crowell-Collier failed to increase its advertising
space as the investor had anticipated it would. Id. at 468.
25 THE WHEAT REPORT 168.
26 The Commission's apparent reluctance to establish a fixed holding period after
which restricted securities become unrestricted may be a result of the problems the Division
[Vol. 45:665
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robust society does not desire a securities law which as interpreted is so
uncertain that it "provides an unfortunate leeway for the unscrupu-
lous '27 and a wide ambit for the exercise of a dragnet philosophy by
the prosecutor.28
Fungibility - Last-in-first-out or "worst-out"?
A surprising concept to the uninitiated, particularly because it is
not set forth in any Commission rule or release, is the fungibility doc-
trine.29 This holds that when the investor makes a series of purchases of
restricted securities of the same issuer or of restricted and unrestricted
securities of the issuer it is impossible to distinguish the securities in an
economic sense - the public sale of one is no different than the public
sale of the other - so that arguably the holding period on all the
securities should commence with the last purchase of restricted securi-
ties and all of the unrestricted should be deemed restricted as well. The
logic in this area has not been overwhelming and has produced some
ludicrous results.
The last-in-first-out theory of fungibility assumes that the investor
is selling the securities acquired most recently. If an investor purchased
unrestricted shares on the market and later purchased restricted shares
in a private placement he could not publicly sell the unrestricted shares
since it would be assumed he were selling the restricted shares in an
economic sense; all of his shares are now restricted. If the investor pur-
chased the restricted securities first and later the unrestricted shares it
would be assumed at the time of subsequent public sale that he were
of Trading and Markets has had with distributions of securities of shell corporations. The
Wheat Report rules offer a solution to this problem in the form of an annual gross
revenues test, and other solutions are suggested herein. See note 50 and accompanying text
infra; notes 78-82 infra. In any event, such regulatory problems may be effectively dealt
with under the antifraud provisions and the powers given to the Commission over the
trading markets and broker-dealers.
27 THE WHEAT REPORT 177.
28 An unfortunate consequence of this uncertainty is that a defendant in an SEC
injunction proceeding must often consent to an injunction in order to allay protracted
litigation regarding his subjective intention, the outcome of which is uncertain. Although
such an injunction is usually consented to "without admitting guilt," the effect of the
injunction can be disastrous upon a person whose future is in the securities industry since
state securities administrators may revoke or refuse to issue agent or broker-dealer licenses
or may refuse to clear a registered public offering of securities of an issuer in which the
defendant has an interest. The SEC may require disclosure in subsequent public offerings,
in which the defendant has an interest, of the proceedings brought against him in prior
years in connection with other matters and the outcome of such proceedings. Stamped
with this badge of inferiority, these persons often retire from the securities industry. This
may be a desirable result where laws of certain application have been willfully violated; it
is an undesirable result where the laws are of uncertain application and the violators are
often first-time offenders who have unwittingly tripped into an alleged securities violation
as a result of such uncertainty.
20 But see note 33 infra.
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selling the unrestricted securities; in this case the unrestricted securi-
ties would remain unrestricted. If restricted securities were acquired
in a series of private placements it would be assumed at the time of
subsequent public sale that the last acquired block of securities were
being sold; the effect is to start the holding period on all of the securities
from the date of the latest acquisition. 30
Most securities lawyers would agree that the Commission at one
time applied the last-in-first-out theory of fungibility.31 Nonetheless,
the Commission now takes the position that a security is fungible
whether it came in first or last.32 Although this position probably makes
more logical sense, it is the harshest application of the doctrine and has
been dubbed the "worst-out" theory of fungibility.
Different lawyers have different attitudes about the doctrine. Many
look to the probable purpose of the doctrine - to prevent a rolling
distribution. This is accomplished by buying restricted or unrestricted
securities, signing up a commitment to buy new restricted securities,
and selling the older securities (which, if formerly restricted, have now
been held for a sufficient holding period to be unrestricted) to raise
money to buy the new restricted securities. This is the basis for the
last-in-first-out formulation. Another example of a rolling distribution
is buying restricted securities, pledging them for a loan to raise money
partially to buy the restricted securities and partially to buy unrestricted
securities on the market, then selling the unrestricted securities when
the market goes up and pay off the loan. This is the basis for a first-in-
30 This is the Commission staff's position with respect to the receipt of contingent
shares issued in an acquisition. See THE WHEAT REPORT 173. Thus, where the parties to the
acquisition cannot agree upon the number of shares to be issued, a commonly used com-
promise is to agree that if the earnings of the candidate in future years meet certain levels,
additional shares, i.e., contingent shares, will be issued by the acquiring corporation to the
former shareholders of the acquired corporation in those years. The compromise dies
aborning when the shareholders of the acquired company learn of the fungibility doctrine.
The ingenuity of securities' counsel comes to the rescue; he suggests that all of the shares
which might be issued under the contingent formula be issued outright to the acquired
corporation's shareholders and then placed by them in escrow to secure the future earnings
performance. The holding period begins to run from the date of issuance, it would seem,
since the purchasers are actually given all the rights of shareholders (they can vote, receive
dividends, etc.) and have all of the investment risks (the issuer need not reacquire the
shares, should future earnings levels not be met unless it wants to exercise its right to
reacquire the shares, usually for a small price). Since the adoption of Accounting Principles
Board Opinion No. 16, which disallows pooling of interests treatment for acquisitions
involving contingent shares, this problem will arise less frequently. AICPA, APB Op. No.
16 (1970).
3i FsRsT ANNUAL SEcuarriEs REGULATION INSTITUTE, PLI CoRPoRATE LAW AND PRACTICE
TRANSCRIPT SERIES No. 11, 65 (A. Fleischer, D. Glazer & R. Mundheim eds. 1970). [here-
inafter PLI TRANScRPT NO. 11].
32 Id. 102 (remarks of Mr. Charles E. Shreve, Director, SEC Division of Corporation
Finance).
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first-out formulation of the doctrine. In both cases, the economic effect
is that the public has supplied the money for the purchase of restricted
securities. Following this theory, there are situations where the doctrine
would not be applied. If a person owned a large block of shares of
unrestricted securities and accepts a stock option for a few hundred
shares, since no money is required to accept the option and very little
is required to exercise it, it is not appropriate to apply the doctrine to
the entire large block of shares which need not be sold to raise that
small amount of money. It is believed that notwithstanding the "worst-
out" official position of the Commission, as a practical matter fungibil-
ity is a factual matter. Where there is little possibility of a rolling
distribution, a no-action letter can probably be obtained.33 But this is
not certain.
The Group Concept of Person
Controlling persons and the brokers who sell the shares of con-
trolling persons have had some difficulty with the word "person" as
used in rule 133(d) and rule 154.34 In computing the 1 percent maxi-
mum sale permitted in any six-month period under those rules, only
sales by the person making the sale are counted. However, the staff of
the Commission construes the word "person" as if it said "persons" in
any situation where the relationship among a group of persons is such
as to indicate that they act in concert, that is, they act or might logically
be expected to act as a syndicate in their sales.35
This is another calculated attempt by the Commission to reduce
the flow of unregistered securities to the public. The position of the
Commission is quite justified where personal investment and sale deci-
sions are made on a group basis or are controlled by one member of the
group and such sales benefit the members of the group. A father and
33 With the advent of the publication by the Commission of its responses to requests
for no-action letters, its true position in this area is becoming known. See, e.g., In re Mark
Systems, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,979 (Jan. 10, 1971) where the Commission noted
that the fungibility concept would not be applied in the case of receipt of warrants subse-
quent to the original purchase of shares, when the warrants are issued in consideration of
the purchaser's undertaking to purchase collateral pledged by the issuer with a bank should
it default on a loan. See also In re Neotec Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,976 (Jan. 18,
1971).
34 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.183(d), 280.154 (1970); SEC PROBLElMs 115 (remarks of Mr. Cohen).
35 These rules permit a controlling person to make casual sales within certain limita-
tions if his shares are unrestricted. In the absence of these rules, the controlling person
would be treated as if he held restricted securities with a perpetual holding period. The
rules are designed to permit leakage of a limited amount of securities within a six-month
period, but not successive six-month periods - (see note 41 and accompanying text infra),
in ordinary trading transactions with minimal or no selling effort. They are calculated to
permit a controlling person to realize somewhat on his investment.
1971]
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his minor children for whom he is acting as custodian should not each
be permitted to sell up to 1 percent; their sales are generally deemed
sales by one person since the proceeds of sales undoubtedly benefit the
entire group and sales are made in concert for the benefit of the group.
Relatives living in the same home may generally be included in the
same group as would sales by a group of persons who act in tandem or
in concert with respect to their sales, e.g., when the persons are partners
in a business and make investments with partnership money. This
concept of person has been summarized by the Commission in releases
regarding rule 154 as "a group of closely related persons."3 6 Neverthe-
less, like all uncertain concepts it has a tendency to expand. Although
most securities lawyers would agree that all members of a controlling
group of an issuer would not be considered "a group of closely related
persons,"3 7 a recent case seems to imply that the concept extends to all
members of a control group.38 It is submitted that this case is not cor-
rect and is inconsistent with the Commission pronouncements on the
subject and the purposes of rules 133(d) and 154.39 Rule-making by
the Commission is needed to clear up this area of law.40
36 SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 4669 (Feb. 17, 1964) and 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966). As
will be seen, the expansion of the person concept in rule 144 beyond the group of closely
related persons creates insuperable problems for the seller and his broker and brings an
unacceptable degree of uncertainty to this area of securities law. See note 93 and ac-
companying text infra.
37 If the Commission had wanted to use the concept of controlling group in the cited
releases it would have done so since the concept is not without substance, having been
construed in several proceedings before the Commission and the courts. At a joint ALI-
ABA Conference on Governmental Regulation at the University of Wisconsin Law School
in August 1966, Charles Shreve, then Director of the Division of Corporation Finance of
the SEC, went to great pains to disabuse members of the bar of the idea that a "group of
closely related persons" meant a control group. The examples given in the text are those
given by him at that conference. Mr. Shreve summarized his position as follows: where the
persons have a close relationship, either family or business, amounting to a "community
of interest" between, or concerted action by the persons, it is probable that they are to be
considered the same person for purposes of the 1 percent limitation on sales by that person
in rules 133(d) and 154.
38 Strathmore Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8207 (Dec. 13, 1967),
discussed in PLI TRANsCRtur No. 11,115. The SEC first found that nineteen stockholders
were members of a control group dominated by one person and found that their combined
sales exceeded the 1 percent leakage provision of rule 133(d). The Commission does seem to
approach the "community of interest" or acting in concert concepts: "Perma was a small
corporation and most of its 19 stockholders were united by family, personal or business ties
and acted in concert with or acquiesced in the actions of [the senior executive] as their
leader." Id.
39 See PLI TRANscRiPT No. 11,116. Although the Strathmore case seems to approach the
"community of interest" or acting in concert concepts, the nineteen shareholders did not
make their personal investment decisions as to sales of stock as a group or on the basis of
the decision of the senior executive, nor did such sales benefit all members of the group.
The concept of controlling group is much broader than the person concept because it has
to do with control of the management and policies of a corporation (see rule 405, 17 C.F.R.
§ 2O.405 (1970)) not with personal investment decisions.
The group of persons in Strathmore apparently controlled the management and
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Successive Six-Month Sales
How often may rule 133(d) and rule 154 be used by controlling
persons or brokers selling for them? The rules would seem by their
terms to permit their use every six months. In 1964, the Commission
confirmed, in writing, what had been its informal interpretation of rule
154, namely, that if a plan exists to effect a series of sales every six
months, this is not the ordinary trading permitted a controlling person
by the rule but is a distribution beyond the confines of the rule.4' A
plan is another matter of subjective intention which in turn must be
demonstrated by objective evidentiary facts. Can an attorney advise his
client to use rule 154 twice in succession? Three times in succession?
Twice in succession, skip one six-month period, and then once again?
Varying advice is given by securities attorneys on this question.
The summary above is by no means a catalogue of all the uncertain-
ties in the area of disposition of restricted securities.42 However, these
are the major uncertain areas that the Wheat Report, the 160 Series and
proposed rule 144 attempt to solve.
TE WHEAT REPORT AND THE 160 SERIEs
The Wheat Report
The Wheat Report recognized that solutions to the uncertain areas
must be made by rules which are responsive to the purpose of the 1933
Act, which is "[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce ... and to prevent
policies of the corporation and were therefore members of a control group. Since the
purpose of rule 133(d) and rule 154 is to allow leakage of a small amount of securities by
individual controlling persons so that they will not be locked-in forever and may realize
to some extent on their investment, the concept of person should be limited to those whojointly make a sale decision and those who receive the direct benefit of leakage sales.
40 It is interesting to note that the Commission applies the group concept of person
when it is concerned about limiting the flow of unregistered securities to the public with-
out the disclosures that would be made in a statutory prospectus. Rule 254, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.254 (1970), provides that a person other than the issuer may offer up to 5100,000 of
securities under Regulation A. Since sales under Regulation A are accompanied or pre-
ceded by an offering circular which has been reviewed by an SEC regional office, the Com-
mission will allow any number of persons, related or unrelated, whether they act in
concert or in tandem, each to sell up to $100,000 under Regulation A. (Based on informal
advice given to the author by Arthur Pennekamp, Director of the San Francisco Regional
Office of the SEC.)
41 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669 (Feb. 17, 1964).
42 The elusive concept of control and "transaction not involving a public offering" are
two major uncertain areas which deserve clarification by Commission rule-making. See
THE WHEAT REPORT 156-59. With respect to the second concept, it is suggested that the
solution may be in a rule which requires (1) a legend on the shares as a condition to using
the rule to establish a valid private offering, cf. id. at 219, (2) certain numerical tests and
(3) certain types of dose relationships to the issuer or business sophistication. See, e.g., CAr.
ADMm. CODE § 260.102.2 (1969), 1 BLUE SKY L. R.P. 8,614 (Feb. 18, 1971).
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frauds in the sale thereof. .. .4a The proposed rules were designed with
an eye on the admonition of Mr. Justice Clark that "[t]he focus of
inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded
by registration."44 In determining the need of offerees for protection,
and the amount of statutory disclosure, i.e., 1933 Act registration, re-
quired in any given situation, three themes pervade the Wheat Report
in this area: (1) where the issuer is providing information concerning
its business and financial affairs in regular reports to the Commission
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as embellished by the Wheat
Report), (2) where the quantity of securities being sold is "modest"
rather than "massive" and (3) where there is not a heavily compensated
selling effort in selling the securities to the public but rather the securi-
ties are sold in ordinary brokers' transactions at standard brokerage
commissions with no underwriting or stabilizing effort, then the need
for 1933 Act disclosure and the protections afforded by registration is
less. 45 Accordingly, the rules proposed by the Wheat Report permit
unrestricted (held by controlling persons) and restricted (held by con-
trolling or noncontrolling persons) securities of reporting companies to
be sold to the public in rule 154-type transactions, i.e., 1 percent sales
if there are no solicitation of orders to buy by the broker and the broker
receives only the minimum commission permitted on a national secu-
rities exchange.46 Heretofore, rule 154 has been limited to controlling
persons holding unrestricted securities. The Wheat Report placed
controlling persons and noncontrolling holders of restricted securities
(and brokers selling on their behalf) on the same footing under one
rule as far as casual sales are concerned. The peculiar situation of giv-
ing controlling persons the right to make rule 154-type casual sales while
denying non-controlling investment purchasers any leakage at all would
be eliminated.47
One of the important findings of the Wheat Report in this area
43 Securities Act of 1933, preamble. See also THE WHEAT REPORT 178.
44 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953).
45 THE WHEAT REPORT ch. VI, especially 156 & 189.
46 Id. app. VI-1. Although not articulated in the report itself, a pragmatic reason
for permitting such sales in the absence of registration is that a shelf registration is of
little utility because of difficulties in keeping the prospectus current and distributing
the most current prospectus to the ultimate purchaser and because of other problems
with such registrations. See Current Problems of Securities Underwriters and Dealers,
in SiECrE!) ARTICLEs ON FEDERAL SEcuRrTIEs LAw 31, 62-64 (H. Wander & W. Grienen-
berger eds. 1968). The rules do not cover non-public sales which, of course, may be made
without registration.
47 THE WHEAT REPORT 181, 185. Any securities' attorney who has had to explain this
anomalous situation to his client is cautioned to read the late W. McNeil Kennedy's play,
The Case of The Scarlet Letter, 23 Bus. LAw. 23 (1967). The client finally jumps out of the
office window to provide the required change in circumstances.
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is that the change of circumstances doctrine and the holding period
requirement are essentially nonfunctional in the context of the Act in
that they bear no relation to the needs of investors for adequate dis-
closure, because as soon as the required holding period, coupled with
change of circumstances, if necessary, has been met, the seller may
engage in a very substantial selling effort (paying whatever underwrit-
ing discount he wishes) to sell a massive amount of his securities without
any disclosure whatsoever.4 The report would completely eliminate
the change of circumstances doctrine. 49 As to the holding period, the
report admitted that the purpose of the Act would logically dictate that
restricted securities could never be sold to the public without registra-
tion. In other words, there would be no particular holding period, but
rather an indefinite holding period. The Study concluded that "[p]er-
petual restraints on alienation have been viewed with disfavor and
would creat difficulties in the administration of the Act." The report
fixed a five-year holding period after which restricted securities be-
come unrestricted if the issuer meets a $250,000 annual gross revenues
test designed to give assurance it is a going business and not a shell
corporation.50 It is submitted that there is an additional, perhaps more
meaningful, reason why restricted securities cannot be restricted in-
definitely. Neither the legislative history, nor the wording of the 1933
Act indicates an intention to severely reduce the flow of venture capital
into business enterprises, which might be the result of such a construc-
tion.5' The concept that securities might be sold in a non-public offering
did not encompass the idea that the purchasers could never sell the
securities without registration. If this had been the idea, the complex
definition of underwriter in section 2(11) of the Act would be unneces-
sary - it would have been a simple matter to draft section 4(1) to read:
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, dealer, controlling
person, or person who acquired the securities in a transaction referred
to in section 4(2)." The Act contemplates that after some period of time
a person ought to be able to establish he is not an underwriter.
Restricted securities of reporting companies would be subjected to
a one-year holding period before they could be sold under the I percent
limitations of the Wheat Report rules. The purpose of this holding
period is to prevent "[t]he use of obstensible private purchasers as con-
duits for the sale of securities [by the issuer] to the public."8 2 Restricted
48 THE WHEAT REPORT 168.
49 Id. 188. See note 26 and accompanying text supra; notes 78-82 infra.
S0 THE WHEAT REPoRT 189, 244.
51 See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
52 THE WHEAT REPORT 199.
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securities of non-reporting companies could not be sold under the rules
and would have to await the five-year holding period before they could
be sold. It is at this point that there was a justifiable parting of the ways
between the recommendations of the Study and the ideas of the Com-
mission.53
As to unrestricted shares held by controlling persons, the Wheat
Report would leave the law substantially unchanged: a controlling
person who acquires his shares in the trading market is not subject to a
particular holding period as such, but can only sell his securities to the
public within the 1 percent leakage limits permitted by the proposed
rules;54 the net effect is that the controlling person has an indefinite
holding period.
The Wheat Report55 and the Commission" agree that the concept
of fungibility "bears little relationship to the needs of investors for
disclosure" and, accordingly, the fungibility concept was thought to be
eliminated in the Wheat Report rules and in proposed rule 144 with
one limited exception designed to prevent rolling distributions, i.e.,
the holder shall not have purchased any additional restricted securities
of the same issuer during the one-year (eighteen months in the case of
rule 144) holding period.57 Notwithstanding the statements that the
fungibility concept has been abandoned, it has been preserved in rule
162(b)(3)(E) proposed by the Wheat Report, rule 162(a)(4) of the 160
Series and proposed rule 144(a)(2)(A). In determining the amount of
securities which may be sold, one must take into account "all other sales
of the same class within the preceding six [rule 144 - twelve] months
by or on behalf of the same offeror [rule 144 -the person and his
associates]." This would include sales of unrestricted securities in the
open market. The Wheat Report stated that "[p]urchases of securities
of the same class in the open market, and sales, either of restricted or
unrestricted securities, should not affect the period of holding."58 The
fact is that sales of unrestricted securities acquired in the open market
do affect the period of holding of restricted securities because to the
extent that they use up the 1 percent limit they require the restricted
securities to be held for another six months. This is fungibility in
reverse. It is submitted that the rules should restrict resale of restricted
53 See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
54 He can, of course, sell in a private placement and sell to the public under 3(a)(1l)
or Regulation A or can register his securities. See THE WHEAT REPORT 199 n.45, 228.
55 Id. 174.
56 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970).
57 THE WHEAT REPORT 201, 230-32; proposed rule 144(a)(1)(c).
58 THE WHEAT REPoRT 201; see also id. 199 n.45 & 231.
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securities by noncontrolling persons only by reference to prior sales of
restricted securities in order to prevent rolling distributions through
successive sales of restricted securities. To accomplish this result it is
recommended that securities not acquired in a "transaction not involv-
ing a public offering"6 i9 should be disregarded for purposes of the cited
rules and excepted from them.
As to the contingent stock situation,60 the Wheat Report rules
provide that the additional contingent shares are deemed to have been
purchased at the time of the original sale of the assets to the issuer,
provided that the sale took place at least one year prior to the receipt
of the shares and no additional payment of money or property was
made. In other words, contingent stock is treated just as if it were a
stock split or stock dividend -the holding period of the stock origi-
nally acquired is tacked to the newly received contingent shares.
As to the tacking of holding periods, the Wheat Report rules
would eliminate tacking questions in connection with stock dividends,
stock splits, recapitalizations, securities transferred on death or as gifts,
certain business combinations, termination of trusts, foreclosure by a
pledgee and securities acquired on conversion and, with certain modifi-
cations, would tack the holding periods of securities received in such
transactions with the holding periods of securities already held or
exchanged in such transactions.61 Rule 155 would be repealed.62
The group concept of person would be limited to members of a
carefully defined family group living in the same home. 3 A definition
of offeror was embodied in the report's rule 162; the definition is close
to the definition of associate in rule 405.6 The persons encompassed in
this definititon are those with a close "community of interest" whose sales
are most likely to be made in concert. It is true that there are possibly
other situations where persons have a "community of interest" and act
in concert.65 The uncertainty which would be created in trying to cover
these situations seems to call for a more restrictive definition such as
that adopted by the Study. Having provided that only securities of
59 The following language would be even better: "in a transaction claimed to be
exempt from registration by reason of section 4(2) of the Act."
60 See note 30 supra; THE WHEAT REPoRT app. VI-1, rule 162(c)(1).
61 THE WHEAT REPORT 201, 238-43.
62 Id. 236-38.
63 Id. 196.
64 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1970). Offeror is less broad than associate because it requires
that an associated corporation be controlled by the person, whereas rule 405 requires only
that he be an officer, partner or 10 percent security holder. This is justified because of the
"community of interest" idea behind the person concept. See note 37 supra.
65 E.g., partners making investments in tandem. See note 36 and accompanying text
supra.
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reporting companies may be sold under the rule, there is not the
compelling need to structure a rule which will cover all "community
of interest" situations. The limitation on successive six-month sales
would be dropped.0 6
There is one serious technical defect in proposed rule 161(a) which
is repeated in proposed rule 144(a). The wording begs fhe question by
providing that the rule is applicable to securities acquired by a person
"in a transaction not involving a public offering." This could possibly
be construed to produce a "ping-pong" effect: You are entitled to use
the rule only if you establish you acquired your securities in a private
offering in the first place. A sale believed to be made pursuant to the
rule could in fact be a violation of the 1933 Act if the private offering
exemption were not available in connection with the original acquisi-
tion of the securities sold to you. The certainty to be provided by the
rule would be lost if the person using it is required to prove that he
acquired his securities in a valid private offering. It had been one of
the purposes of the Wheat Report to establish objective tests which
would make such proof unnecessary.67 The person making the offer
pursuant to the rule and his broker will frequently be unable to verify
the non-public nature of the original transaction. This is particularly
so where the person making the sale acquired his shares from another
person who did not acquire his shares in a valid private offering. The
problem can be solved by qualifying the language to read "in a trans-
action claimed to be exempt from registration by reason of section
4(2) of the Act, whether or not the transaction was exempt from
registration, unless the offeror has actual knowledge that the transaction
was not so exempt. '68
66 THE WHEAT REPORT 196. Since this limitation was never contained in a Commission
rule, the method chosen to drop it was to announce that sales limited as described in the
rules could be made in successive six-month periods without violations of the rule. 160
Series at 7.
67 THE WH AT REPORT 152, 204-05. Rule 161(c) of the 160 Series solves only one ex-
ample of this problem: where some person other than the person using the rule makes a
public offering of securities acquired in the same transaction as the person using the rule,
thus making a public offering out of a former private-offering transaction. It does not
solve the problem of actions by the issuer or of inadvertent actions by the person using the
rule, i.e., several statements or actions indicating lack of investment intent, which destroy
the private offering. Proposed rule 144 does not even contain a provision comparable to
proposed rule 161(c).
68 Such a proposal would not relieve the issuer, controlling person or any person who
sold the security in violation of section 5 from liability under sections 12 and 17 of the
Act, thus inhibiting invalid private placements with the intention of distributing the
securities by means of the rule. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 771, 77g (1964). The proposal properly re-
lieves the innocent offeror of liability for acts of which he has no knowledge, and places the
holding of Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
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Another technical defect is contained in proposed rule 162(c)(1)
which is repeated in proposed rule 144(a)(1)(D)(i). These provisions
attempt to allow tacking of the holding periods with respect to stock
dividends, stock splits and recapitalizations. Logic would require that
the holding period of shares acquired as .a stock dividend date back to
the date the original investment was made. However, later successive
stock dividends do not seem to date back to the original investment
under the proposed rules but rather date back to the preceding stock
dividend ("the shares on which the dividend was paid"). If an issuer
declares an annual stock dividend the holder may not be able to dispose
of his shares because of the holding period requirement.
In various situations it is difficult to determine when the entire
consideration for securities has been paid. As a result, proposed rule
162(c)(1) and proposed rule 144(a)(1)(B), which both require the full
purchase price to have been paid at least twelve (eighteen) months prior
to the offering, are difficult to interpret. For example, if there is an
installment purchase of shares by payment of a promissory note due in
installments, has the full purchase price been paid upon original deliv-
ery of the note,69 as to the proportion of the aggregate amount of
securities acquired as each note installment is paid, or upon payment
of the last installment on the note? The problem is more difficult when
the consideration is less tangible. Suppose an employee is issued secu-
rities in consideration for entering into a long-term employment agree-
ment; add to this the situation where the securities may be reacquired
by the issuer on a decreasing percentage basis if employment is pre-
maturely terminated. Rule 162 specifically dealt with the similar
problem of a contingent stock acquisition, but the requirement that no
additional payment of money or property be made after the original
acquisitions would indicate the answer to the installment note purchase
example above is that the holding period begins to run on the last
payment on the note. Counsel for venture capitalists would be well
advised to insist on a series of separate cash purchases rather than on
installment purchase of a block of stock.
(1959), in proper context. There, the burden was placed on the sellers to establish "a
reasonable and bona fide belief" that the total number of offerees was not so great as to
destroy the private offering exemption; the proposal in the text moves a step back from
this position, requiring actual knowledge that the exemption is not available. In any
event, the mandatory one-year or five-year holding period prevents the use of ostensible
private purchases as conduits for sale of securities by use of the rule.
69 For purposes of a corporations law requiring payment in money or property for
shares, a promissory note is considered by some courts to be full payment. See, e.g., Quartz
Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Joyce, 27 Cal. App. 523, 150 P. 648 (Dist. Ct. App. 1915).
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The 160 Series
Six months after the Wheat Report was published, the Commission
published for comment a series of rules based on the rules proposed by
that report. The proposed rules were almost identical to those proposed
by the Wheat Report discussed above, but were different in certain
material respects which are set forth below.
The annual gross revenues requirement was changed from four
years of $250,000 of annual gross revenues to five years.70 Since the
holding period is five years, the obvious purpose of a four-year period
had been to give a one-year grace period to a start-up enterprise. The
effect of extending the annual gross revenues requirement for an
additional year is an extension of the holding period to six years for
most beginning enterprises, whose annual gross revenues in the first
year of operation are very often nominal. Since the SEC later became
concerned that the annual gross revenues requirement was unduly
restrictive and might adversely affect the ability of small companies to
raise capital, it is difficult to understand why the Commission length-
ened the period of the annual gross revenues requirement. 71
A new rule 161(c) was proposed in order to reduce the burden
imposed upon the person using the rule of having to prove that the
shares were acquired in a transaction not involving a public offering.72
Rule 161(c) provides that a restricted security remains such, i.e., it
remains within the confines of the 160 Series rules, notwithstanding the
fact that another person makes a public offering of securities acquired
in the transaction or chain of transactions in which the securities
subject to the 160 Series was acquired.
In order to reduce manpower requirements, the list of qualified
issuers, i.e., reporting companies, proposed by the Wheat Report to be
maintained by the Commission was dropped and an objective definition
of qualified issuer was proposed in rule 163. It is not immediately
apparent why the Commission believes that it will incur significant
manpower problems in maintaining a list of qualified issuers when it
presently maintains a restricted list of Canadian issues which are being
illegally sold in the United States. 73
Rule 162(c)(1) proposed by the Wheat Report contained a pro-
vision which excepted stock purchased on exercise of qualified stock
70160 Series, rule 161(b); cf. THE WHEAT REPORT app. VI-, rule 161(c).
71 See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
72 See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
73 See note 82 and accompanying text infra for discussion of solutions to the manpower
problem.
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options and under qualified employee stock purchase plans from the
limited one-year fungibility requirement designed to prevent rolling
distributions. This was omitted from rule 162(c)(1) of the 160 Series
without comment or explanation by the Commission.74
In a slight retreat to the fungibility doctrine, rule 162(c)(2) was
revised to provide that if any part of an interest in a business transferred
in exchange for restricted securities had been acquired by the offeror
within one year prior to his acquisition of the restricted securities, the
holding period with respect to the restricted securities would begin on
the date of the latest acquisition of such part or parts of the interest.
The Wheat Report rule had broken with the fungibility concept in this
regard and had provided that the separate part or parts of the interest
are to be treated separately, and the holding requirement as to an
equivalent proportion of the restricted securities shall be deemed satis-
fied one year after the acquisition of each such part. Again, no reason
was given in the release for this partial retreat to the fungibility
doctrine.
These are essentially all of the substantive changes made by the
160 Series from the Wheat Report. To the extent the changes may be
regarded as adverse, they are certainly not substantial and the Com-
mission's proposals are substantially the same as the Wheat Report
proposals. It had been hoped by many that the search for certainty had
ended and that the proposals would be adopted in short course. How-
ever, this was not to be the case.
PROPOSED RULE 144
Commission Objections to the 160 Series - Steps Forward
Rule 144 was proposed by the Commission as an alternative to the
160 Series.7 5 The Commission had three objections to the Wheat Report
proposals: (1) the "holding period of one year is too short and would
result in the sale of large amounts of unregistered securities to the
public"; (2) the requirement that restricted securities of nonreporting
companies could not be sold at all unless the issuer "had substantial
annual gross revenues for each of the past five years" is "unduly re-
strictive and would adversely affect the ability of small companies to
raise capital."; (3) the Commission does not have sufficient manpower
to maintain a list of qualified issuers or to examine 1934 Act filings to
assure they meet the applicable requirements; and (4) the concept of
qualified issuer combined with the annual gross revenues test might
74 See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
75 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970).
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"give the impression that the Commission is permitting the sale of
securities on the basis of their investment merit."76
All of these objections except the last are well taken. Each objec-
tion can be answered by appropriate amendments to the 160 Series or
other rules without adopting a new rule, such as rule 144, which pro-
duces more uncertainties and raises more objections than it answers.
As to the holding period, the Wheat Report recognized that views as
to the appropriate length differed appreciably;77 if the eighteen-month
holding period in rule 144(a)(1)(A) is the price for obtaining certainty,
then change the one-year holding period in the 160 Series to eighteen
months. As to the annual gross revenues requirement, the Commission
is to be complimented for its recognition of the importance of venture
capital investments in small business in the United States.78 The pur-
pose of the $250,000 five-year annual gross revenue requirement was to
prevent circumvention of the rules by setting up shell corporations
having no operations and holding their securities on the shelf for five
years.79 The Commission's solution to the annual gross revenue re-
76 Id.
77 THE WHEAT REPORT 200. Some persons had strongly urged that the holding period
should be two years. Eighteen months is an obvious and acceptable compromise by the
Commission.
78 The author is aware of several venture capital situations in which the maturation
period - the period during which the business is expected to show little revenues because
of a lengthy research and development period - is three to five years. To require the
venture capitalist to either go through the expense of registration or to hold his shares
for a total of eight to ten years before the company meets the five-year annual gross
revenues requirement seems restrictive. The amount of tinkering with the annual gross
revenues requirement indicates that there is considerable controversy inside the Commis-
sion regarding it. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
79 See notes 26, 50 and accompanying text supra; THE WHEAT REPORT 203. It is sub-
mitted that the Commission may have already invented an answer to this problem in rule
253 of Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.253 (1970): (1) the issuer must have had a net income
from operations for at least one of the last two fiscal years, or (2) if it does not meet this
test then the restricted securities can be sold only if all promotional securities, i.e., stock
issued for assets or services (stock could be deemed issued for services if it were issued for
a cash consideration of less than, e.g., 75 percent of the sale price of the restricted securities),
and securities issued or proposed to be issued to directors, officers, promoters and securities
dealers are placed in escrow for one year with a prohibition against public resale to prevent
bail-outs by the insiders. Unless the venture capitalists are either able to produce a net
income, which is more important to an investor than a revenues test, or are willing to put
their money on the line, as promoters of the enterprise, by agreeing to stay in the enterprise
for another year, restricted securities of non-reporting companies could not be sold to the
public. The important point is that the venture capitalists have the option of not having
to comply with an annual gross revenues or net income test. The proposal is somewhat
similar to promotional stock restrictions which may be imposed by the California Commis-
sioner of Corporations, see Cal. App. Code § 260.141 (1969), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 8,628
(Sept. 16, 1969), but has the advantage that when the restriction will be imposed and lifted
is not left up to the discretion of the administrator, but is made certain by the rule. The
California Commissioner's rule also requires the promoters to waive the right to receive
dividends and proceeds on liquidation until the restrictions are lifted. Venture capitalists
seldom object to these restrictions since new ventures seldom pay dividends and if there is
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quirement was the same as for its manpower problem and its con-
cern that qualified issuers had the Commission stamp of approval: It
eliminated the annual gross revenue requirement and the qualified
issuer concept and established a requirement in rule 144(a)(3) that
there be publicly available current information about the issuer which
would presumptively be satisfied, i.e., maintenance of a qualified list
or strict review of 1934 Act filings is not imposed on the Commission,
if the issuer either filed reports under the Exchange Act or published
or furnished to its security holders certain financial and other informa-
tion. Although there are certain mechanical difficulties with paragraph
(a)(3) of rule 144, on the whole this paragraph seems to be a definite
step forward toward full and fair disclosure and, with certain modifica-
tions to make its application more certain,80 and to give a greater degree
of protection from shell corporation distributions,"' it is suggested that
it be incorporated into the 160 Series. 2
There is another provision of rule 144 which is a definite step
forward. Paragraph (a)(4)(B) of the proposed rule would allow the
broker executing the transaction (1) to make inquiries regarding the
security to be sold and (2) to appear in the "sheets". This is prevented
under rule 154. Rule 144 goes slightly further in this regard than the
160 Series rule 162(a)(3) which would permit the broker to appear in
the "sheets" only if he had published bid and offer quotations on at
a liquidation they are resigned to their failure. The five-year holding period would remain
in effect.
80 See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
81 A shell corporation would have little difficulty in preparing current information
about itself since its operations are limited; the fraud in the shell game lies in the projec-
tions of future profits and the method of trading and "touting" which inflates the market
unnecessarily. Although the cure for this ill lies in the antifraud and broker-dealer pro-
visions, (see note 26 supra), adoption of a test such as that previously discussed (see note
79 and accompanying text supra) would help in this area while at the same time not im-
posing a difficult annual gross revenues test and an excessively long holding period on
venture capitalists.
82 Although a less desirable solution, since arguably it may dissuade issuers from filing
required reports and would probably require congressional action to amend the 1934 Act,
it would seem that the manpower problem could be solved by raising money through the
collection of nominal fees in connection with Exchange Act filings by reporting companies.
Since such reporting will provide the basis for sales of restricted securities, and unrestricted
securities held by controlling persons, it does not seem the chilling effect of a nominal fee
would reduce filings.
There does not seem to be a substantive difference between the qualified issuer con-
cept and rule 144(a)(8) at least insofar as the latter attempts to remove the Commission
stamp of approval. Both rules permit leakage sales by reporting companies. The fact that
rule 144 merely establishes a presumption does not seem to remove whatever Commission
stamp of approval is attached to a reporting company. It is submitted that the Commis-
sion's concern in this regard is unwarranted, and that the only change rule 144 has made
to eliminate this concern is to abandon the term qualified issuer. If this is the small price
to pay for eliminating this concern, then by all means the term should be abandoned in
favor of the language of rule 144(a)(3), modified as suggested herein.
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least seven of the ten consecutive business days before his receipt of the
offeror's order and were a bona fide market-maker. When there is a
thin market for securities it is often the case that there is only one
market-maker. This market-maker may be vital to the maintenance
and stability of the thin market. Rule 154 would require that market-
maker, who may be the broker which can obtain best execution, to stop
making the market. In addition, the market may be so thin that quotes
appear in the "sheets" only once every few days. Rule 162(a)(3) would
require the market-maker to get out of the market in this situation, if
he were the executing broker, because he would not have published
quotations on seven of the last ten business days. Rule 144 would allow
the market-maker to remain in the thin market and execute trans-
actions.83 However, as set forth below, rule 144 contains some remark-
able missteps and steps backward in the search for certainty.
Missteps and Steps Backward
(1) Both the release containing proposed rule 144 and the rule
itself imply that restricted securities may be sold to the public only
pursuant to the rule. A person "shall be presumed not to be an under-
writer... if all of the . . . conditions [of the rule] are met".84 Then is
there a negative inference that a person who sells to the public under
circumstances not meeting all of the conditions of the rule is an under-
writer? The release states that the changes in circumstances doctrine
"relate[s] only to the holding period and not to the other provisions of
the rule";8 5 this implies that rule 144 is exclusive, with the minor
exception that change in circumstances may shorten the eighteen-month
holding period required by the rule.86 This possible implication takes
on more substance when we recall that the 160 Series rules are ex-
clusive; resales of restricted securities to the public can only be made
pursuant to the rules. Since perpetual restraints on alienation are
viewed with disfavor, 87 the Wheat Report and the proposed 160 Series
lifted the restriction from restricted securities after five years. Proposed
83 Under some circumstances the market-maker would have to disclose his position
in the market to his customer. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,712 (2d Cir. July 7, 1970), modified, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,962 (Mar. 2, 1971). The
absolute prohibition of rule 154 was formulated before that case was decided. The SEC
is presently considering proposed rules for disclosure by market-makers under various
circumstances.
84 Proposed rule 1,14(a).
85 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970) (emphasis added).
86 If this is the case, one wonders how the Commission intends to supply any certainty
to the change in circumstances area unless it continues the no-action letter procedure it
proposed to discontinue in Release No. 5087.
87 See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
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rule 144 contains no such outer limit -it thus becomes considerably
more burdensome than the Wheat Report and the 160 Series, unless
it is interpreted to be nonexclusive. Let us take the case of the former
company executive who is discharged by the company shortly after he
acquired shares for investment. Since the executive is no longer in a
position to persuade the company to give him current information so
that he can make sales after the eighteen-month period provided in
rule 144, he is locked-in completely if the rule is considered to be ex-
clusive, notwithstanding the length of his holding period, changed
circumstances or the nature of his transaction.
The 1933 Act registration procedure is very expensive and requires
considerable expertise and time.88 In recognition of this fact, neither
the Securities Act, nor the Commission has sought to lock-in issuers
and holders of restricted securities. The private offering exemption
permits sales of shares without registration and, after a suitable holding
period, the exemption is satisfied and the shares are fully transferable
by noncontrolling persons without registration. Casual sales by con-
trolling persons are permitted by rules 133(d) and 154. Any rule, such
as rule 144, which purports to require registration for all future sales
except for leakage sales permitted by the rule is destined to have a
severe adverse impact on venture capital investment because it forces
the venture capitalist to either (a) acquire air-tight8 9 enforceable 0
registration rights, which the issuer or the venture capitalist may find
too burdensome to afford, or (b) buy a security which (except for
leakage sales) can be sold only in private placements or other exempt
transactions, thus assuming an even greater risk than is being taken by
investing in the venture at all. The effect of such a rule will not be to
compel more registrations, but to reduce the number of venture invest-
ments and subsequent resales and thus reduce the number of registra-
tions. Furthermore, any rule which purports to lock-up restricted
88 But see note 121 infra.
89 Various provisions can be inserted in the securities purchased or the purchase
agreement which trigger drastic events in the event of failure to register, thus compelling
the issuer to register. For example, the venture capitalist may purchase an equity position
backed up by debt securities which give the lender the right to accelerate the debt if the
issuer fails to register the equity security. Possibly a voting switch provision may be inserted
in the articles to the effect that in the event there is a failure to register the shares the
holder of the restricted securities will have the right to control the corporation and thereby
replace management and have their shares registered. A provision that there may be an
"up-stream" conversion of equity into debt in the event of failure to register might be
considered, or possibly a provision which requires the issuer to buy back the equity
securities, assuming it has the requisite surplus.
90 See In re Energy Conversion Services, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. Rm. 91,549 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County May 26, 1965), where the court refused to grant judgment against the
officers and directors as individuals requiring them to sign the registration statement.
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securities indefinitely, unless sold pursuant to the rule, may conflict
with the basic underwriter concept in section 2(11) of the Act.91
Accordingly, if the rule is to be adopted, a note should be added to
make it clear that it is not exclusive and merely sets forth certain
limited cases in which a person is not an underwriter and is not
engaged in a distribution, and has no effect on and does not limit all
other cases where a person, by virtue of length of holding period,
changed circumstances, the nature of his transaction or otherwise, may
not be an underwriter and may not be engaged in a distribution.9 2
Two other implications of the rule are that (a) under no circumstances
could there be a holding period of less than eighteen months combined
with changed circumstances which would permit public sale of re-
stricted securities prior to eighteen months and (b) the minimum
holding period is thirty months, eighteen months plus a period of
twelve months for permitted leakage sales under the rule. Thus, the
suggested note should make it clear that the rule does not set a mini-
mum holding period for transactions not covered by it.
(2) The most surprising aspect of rule 144 is contained in para-
graph (a)(2)(B). Sales by all directors, officers and affiliates of the issuer
and their associates are taken into account for purposes of limiting the
amount of securities which may be sold under the rule. This consti-
tutes a vast and unwarranted extension of the Commission's view that
"person" for purposes of rule 154 includes "a group of closely related
persons."'9 3 It also introduces a great deal of uncertainty because it will
be impracticable for the seller and his broker to ascertain the sales by
all members of this enlarged rule 144 group, who may be individuals
over whom the seller has no control and about whom he has no knowl-
edge. Another effect of rule 144(a)(2)(B) may be to compel a race to
the marketplace by the specified persons - in other words, it may
induce sales rather than limiting them. Even the winners of the race to
the marketplace may find themselves in violation of the rule after the
fact as a result of subsequent sales by other members of the group
91 See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
92 Rule 181 proposed by the Wheat Report, which provides that the private offering
exemption is deemed to be applicable to the issuance of securities in the acquisition of a
going business to not more than twenty-five holders of interests in such business, contains
a supplementary note which states the rule is not intended to be exclusive and that,
depending upon the circumstances of the individual case, a transaction in which securities
are sold to more than twenty-five persons may also come within the private offering
exemption. THE WHEAT REPORT app. VI-I.
93 See note 86 and accompanying text supra. Rule 138(d) has basically the rule 154
language. Release 5087 states that rule 154 will be repealed upon adoption of rule 144.
When rule 154 is repealed, rule 133 will still be in effect. Why should there be a difference
between rule 144(a)(2)(B) and rule 188?
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during the twelve-month period which exceed the limitations of rule
144(a)(2).
It is recommended that this paragraph be stricken from the pro-
posed rule and the definition of offeror in proposed rule 162(b) be
adopted. 94 At the same time, in computing sales for purposes of para-
graph (a)(2)(B), sales between members of the group of persons should
be excluded from the limitation.95
It is believed that this paragraph is evidence of a strong concern
by the Commission as to the large amount of securities being sold
simultaneously without registration by separate persons who are in a
controlling relationship with the issuer. Perhaps an intermediate solu-
tion would be to combine sales by all the persons listed for a short
period, such as one month (instead of twelve months), thus reducing
a simultaneous selling effort by several persons.
(3) In addition, paragraph (a)(2)(B) unleashes another bombshell
by implying that sales by officers and directors whose securities are not
otherwise restricted (because they are not controlling persons and did
not acquire their shares in a private offering) are limited to the
percentage permitted in the rule. The rule should expressly negate
this implication since there is nothing in the Securities Act which
provides a basis for such an implication.
94 The Wheat Report noted it had been "strongly suggested" that the rule 154-type
quantity limitation, which would be carried over into rule 162, should be expressed in
terms of 1 percent of the outstanding float, i.e., the floating supply of stock in the market,
and not 1 percent of the total number of outstanding shares. The float would be deter-
mined by subtracting from the total outstanding shares all securities owned by all officers
and directors. "The Study considered this suggestion carefully and determined not to
recommend it. The processes of calculation would be complex, and could possibly result
in inaccurate data." THE WHEAT REPORT 195. One cannot help but think that paragraph
(a)(2)(B) of rule 144 is an attempt to accomplish something akin to that which the Wheat
Report rejected. This is not to say that the recommendation made to the study does not
have validity; it is the author's view that it has considerable merit since it more accurately
gears the quantity limitations to the amount of stock which might be expected to be in-
volved in ordinary brokerage transactions on the market. It does not seem unreasonable to
make the calculation on a continuous basis from Form 4's and Form 3's filed by officers,
directors and 10 percent shareholders under section 16(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1964). This, combined with a recent case implying a private right of action for failure to
file such forms, might even induce more prompt and accurate reporting under section 16(a).
This would seem to be a much more acceptable alternative than paragraph (a)(2)(B),
which looks to actual sales by directors, officers and affiliates whether or not reported to
the SEC, making it difficult for a holder of restricted securities who is not an affiliated
person or an executive of the company to obtain the information necessary to make the
computation and which also seems to imply that a director or officer who is not an affiliate
of the issuer is subject to the rule. With respect to companies whose officers, directors and
10 percent shareholders are not required to file reports under the Exchange Act, leakage
sales under the rule would not be permitted until the five-year holding period had been
satisfied.
95 This can be done by excluding private sales from the limitation. See note 97 and
accompanying text infra.
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(4) The wording in clause (a) of the rule begs the question by
providing that the rule is applicable to a person who has acquired
securities "in a transaction not involving a public offering."96
(5) The 160 Series release specifically noted that proposed rule
162 could be relied upon in successive six-month periods. Since there
is some question whether rules 133 and 154 may be relied upon during
successive periods, either rule 144 or any release adopting it should
state that sales limited as described in paragraph (a)(2)(B) may be made
in successive twelve-month periods.
(6) Like rule 154, proposed rule 144 does not exclude prior non-
public offerings for purposes of the 1 percent limitation in paragraph
(a)(2) on the amount of sales in any twelve-month period. This is
contrary to proposed rule 162(a)(4) which would permit non-public
offerings without affecting the limitation on public sales. No reason
appears for this change in position. It seems justifiable to permit the
offeror to make sales which are admittedly in compliance with the
1933 Act (non-public offerings) without penalizing his public distribu-
tion in accordance with the rule. Thus, a father could sell securities in
a private placement to his son without reducing the amount of his per-
mitted public sales under rule 144. Since private sales do not involve
a public selling effort, there is no preconditioning of the market for
the public sale permitted by the rule.9 7 The penalty in the rule for prior
private sales does not seem designed to accomplish any statutory pur-
pose other than to reduce use of the rule.
(7) Proposed rule 144 does nothing to give certainty to the group
concept of person. It had been one of the purposes of the Wheat Report
to carefully define the person concept to limit it to members of a care-
fully defined family group.98 Paragraph (a)(2) gives some idea that it is
intended that the person and his associates are the same person; if this
is the new outer limit on the person concept, the rule should say so.
The importance of doing so is made more evident by rule 144(a)(1)(C),
which might well be construed to extend the person's holding period
if members of his family (or other persons included in the person
concept) made acquisitions of securities. Certainty for the seller and his
broker, both of whom must make an inquiry to satisfy the rule, requires
a return to a precise definition of offeror as in the Wheat Report.
96 See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
97 The study sees no compelling reason for this reduction [reducing the quantity
which may be sold under rule 154 by sales within the last six months], insofar as
prior private placements are concerned, and the test in rule 162 has been modified
accordingly. Prior public offerings may stand on a somewhat different footing.
Solicitation of buyers is likely to have been widespread during such offerings ....
THE WmAT REPORT 194.
98 See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
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(8) The fungibility concept has been preserved in paragraph
(a)(2)(A) of the rule.99 In addition, the rule further exacerbates the
fungibility problem caused by acquiring successive blocks of stock
because although proposed rule 162(c)(1) provides that the offeror shall
not, during the twelve-month holding period, "have purchased or
agreed to purchase" any other restricted securities of the same issuer,
rule 144(a)(I)(G) provides that the offeror may not, during the holding
period, have "acquired or agreed to acquire" any other restricted secu-
rities. This change in wording may produce unfavorable results be-
cause "purchase" is usually associated with a volitional contract to
purchase securities. 100 For example, an offeror holding securities for
the period required by rule 144 may find his holding period must be
extended if during the holding period a relative makes a gift of, or
dies leaving restricted securities to the offeror. Numerous other non-
volitional acquisitions may lead to the same problem: the forced
conversion of securities upon a call for redemption; securities acquired
upon a recapitalization (even though the offeror voted against it); the
grant of preemptive rights; the fortuitous grant of a stock option to an
employee who had nothing to do with the grant; a contingent stock
acquisition. Rule 144(a)(1)(D) solves the conversion and recapitalization
problems but leaves the other situations untouched.101 Particularly with
respect to an employee granted an option by his company, it would
seem that the desirable effect of granting options to executive em-
ployees should outweigh the impact of the proposed rule, which is to
prevent that employee from selling any shares at all under the rule
until eighteen months after he has been granted the option. Indeed, the
employee can be subjected to substantial hardship in raising capital
to exercise his stock option and the company may find it difficult to
develop an effective stock option plan when employees learn that by
the grant of an option they will be locked-in as to their other restricted
securities, no matter how long their previous holding period.
At a minimum it is proposed, therefore, that an exception to this
limited fungibility provision be made with respect to options and
securities acquired upon exercise of such options, under a plan which
99 See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
100 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964);
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). This
is not to say that the purchase terminology is perfect. Some nonvolitional acquisitions have
sometimes been included in this term as well. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,875 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1970) (tender offeror forced to sell
securities by virtue of defensive merger by target company).
101 Proposed rule 162 specifically took care of the gift and death acquisition problems,
the contingent stock acquisition problem and other situations by providing tacking benefits.
R.le 144(a)(1)(D) limits the tacking benefits to recapitalizations and conversions.
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meets the requirements of section 422, section 423 or section 424 of the
Internal Revenue Code.10 2 A somewhat comparable provision appeared
in rule 162(c) proposed by the Wheat Report;1 3 this wording did not
appear in the Commission's proposed rule 162. At a maximum, the
Commission should deal in the rule with the entire problem of non-
volitional acquisitions which extend the holding period; a return to
the "purchase" terminology of the Wheat Report would be a step in the
right direction.
(9) Proposed rule 144 would exempt only the transaction by the
person actually making the offer and sale. However, as a result of the
sale by this person there could be a loss of the private offering exemp-
tion for other persons. Proposed rule 180 was designed to prevent loss
of the exemption from occurring as a result of any public resale trans-
actions which are exempted by the proposed rule. It is not apparent
why a comparable rule was not proposed in conjunction with rule 144.
(10) Present rules 133(d) and 154 now permit sales of the same
quantity referred to in paragraph (a)(2)(A) during the six-month period
rather than the twelve-month period proposed by rule 144. No reason
appears in the release why the Commission decided to cut in half the
permissible amount of shares which could be sold by controlling
persons under present rule 154 and by holders of restricted securities
and controlling persons under the Wheat Report rules and the 160
Series. Perhaps the Commission felt that controlling persons have too
frequently used rule 154 so that speculative issues have been sold to
the public in large quantities without 1933 Act disclosure. Some per-
sons consulted by the Study felt the leakage limits were "far too gener-
ous and permit major dispositions of securities."' 04 After analysis of the
limitations and an empirical study, the Wheat group was not persuaded
that the limitations should be reduced,105 but left the door open to
decrease the quantity limitations after a period of experience with the
proposed rules. 06 With no experience under the rules (since they have
not yet been adopted), the Commission, without comment, has pro-
posed reduced quantity limitations in rule 144.107 With the advent of
102 INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, §§ 422-24.




107 It is possible to speculate that the Commission was trying to solve another problem:
rule 154 states only that sales in the "six preceding months" should be taken into account.
If a controlling person sells the maximum number of shares on July Ist, and two days
later sells shares in a registered public offering, this, in the view of the Commission,
subverts the purpose of rule 154 which is to permit casual sales to locked-in controlling
persons. The solution to this problem is to look backward and forward from each individ-
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NASDAQs, the Commission may now employ the trading volume test
as a quantity limitation applicable to casual sales of over-the-counter
securities and in this way assure that sales of some of the more specula-
tive issues traded in the over-the-counter market are limited to modest
amounts of securities consistent with the trading volume.109
(11) The required inquiry of the seller and his selling broker has
been expanded by rule 144 to the point where the uncertainty is un-
acceptable to the seller and his broker. Proposed rale 164(d) requires
that the broker make a reasonable inquiry of his customer. Rule 144(a)
(4)(B)(iii) requires a reasonable inquiry but appears (and the release
appears to confirm)"0 to require inquiry beyond the customer. The
footnote to rule 144 provides that reasonable inquiry should include
inquiry as to the seller's and his associates' transactions and current and
non-public information about the issuer. The only source of such
information other than the seller and his associates is the issuer, its
officers, directors and executives, controlling persons, the issuer's in-
vestment bankers and transfer agent. Since these persons and firms are
under no obligation to provide the broker with the information and
since they may be under a duty not to disclose non-public information
and the broker may be under a duty not to use it,"' the broker may
find it extremely difficult to satisfy the duty of inquiry imposed by
ual sale on a hindsight basis. It would be preferable to have one look backward and
forward three months on each side of a particular sale in order to reduce the amount of
hindsight time. If the Commission believes a twelve-month period is appropriate then one
should look backward and forward six months from each sale. For example, if our executive
sold on July 1st the maximum permitted by the rule, then he would not be permitted for
another six months to sell any shares except in a private offering or other exempt trans-
action. When this step has been taken, the 1 percent limit on the amount which may be
sold may be raised to 2 percent to bring the rule into line with the present rule 154.
108 This is a national automatic (computerized) quotation service for securities traded
over-the-counter, which is sponsored by the NASD. Interdealer bids and transactions are
now quoted on NASDAQ and trading volume quotes by the service should go into effect
shortly. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1971, at 51, col. 4.
109 At the same time, the Commission might consider allowing principal transactions
as well as agency transactions, i.e., brokerage transactions, under the rule now that NASDAQ
is in effect. NASDAQ would give interdealer bids on an accurate basis with respect to
over-the-counter securities so that it would be possible to set limits on the compensation
to the dealer, and thus keep down his selling effort, by requiring that the price, paid by
the dealer, could not be less than the interdealer bid price. See THE WEAT REPORT 198-99.
However, in order to avoid the problem of the dealer putting on his shelf a large amount
of securities acquired in casual sale transactions and then dumping them on the market,
some requirement would have to be made that the dealer dispose of the securities in
ordinary brokerage or other principal transactions within a certain number of days,
perhaps ten.
110 "[Blrokers involved in the transaction will have the obligation to determine
whether adequate current information is publicly available." SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970). See also note 120 and accompanying text infra.
111 See, e.g., SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., CCH FED. Sac. L. RaPs. 92,280 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
7, 1968); In re Investors Management Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP,. 77,832 (June 26, 1970).
1971]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
rule 144. The seller and the broker may not have the background in
accounting to determine whether the financial statements are "prepared
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles," nor the
close relationship to the issuer to determine if all "material informa-
tion ... as to the issuer's business and management" has been published.
Should the Commission decide not to limit the broker's duty of
inquiry to his customer, at least it should clarify rule 144(a)(4)(A)(iii)
and item 9 to indicate that the offering may only be made if the seller
represents he has no knowledge of any non-public material information
about the issuer, in order to (1) avoid any inference that the seller may
comply with the rule by disclosing nonpublic information to the
broker and (2) relieve the broker from having to approach the issuer
and others to obtain non-public information.
Rule 144(b) delivers the crowning blow to broker participation in
a rule 144 transaction. Rule 144 withholds the section 4(4) exemption
from the broker if it turns out the transaction is not made "pursuant
to the provisions of this rule." Accordingly, even if the broker made a
reasonable inquiry, if it turned out his principal sold more than the
rule allows, or that the current public information was inaccurate, etc.
the broker would be denied his exemption. Neither rule 154 nor
proposed rule 164 are so harsh; both of those rules grant the broker
his exemption if he has made his inquiry and is not aware or has no
grounds for believing the transactions are not being made pursuant to
the provisions of the rule. Rule 144(b) must be revised to return to rule
164.
(12) The Commission states in the release accompanying rule
144 that it proposes to eliminate the no-action letter procedure. Were
the Commission at the same time to improve its 1934 Act reporting
review so that it could see its way clear to adopt a rule comparable to
that proposed by the Wheat Report, the elimination of the no-action
letter procedure would be justified because all public sales of restricted
securities would be covered by the exclusive Wheat Report proposal.
In any event, even if rule 144 were adopted, it should significantly
reduce the number of requests for no-action letters by virtue of the
greater degree of certainty it provides (assuming the rule is modified as
suggested here). The Wheat Report noted that to the extent certainty
can be provided, no-action requests would become unnecessary.112 Rule
144 does not provide the certainty which justifies elimination of the
no-action letter procedure.
(13) Rule 144 does not deal effectively with the major areas of
112 THE Wn.AT irORT 175.
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uncertainty, the holding period after which the holder of restricted
securities may sell his shares without restriction, and the change in
circumstances doctrine, except in the case of death.113 The 160 Series
would eliminate the change in circumstances doctrine and establish a
fixed holding period, venture capitalists and other investment pur-
chasers would know in advance the required period of holding after
which they are free to sell without restriction. The risk that a change
in circumstances may result in loss of the investment is outweighed by
the certainty provided by a fixed holding period. In effect, rule 144 is
very much like a proposal made to the Wheat group, but which was
rejected by it.114
(14) Rule 144 does not contain a six-month waiting period be-
tween the effective date of registration of the issuer under the Exchange
Act on Form 10 and the date it becomes a qualified issuer. Since a Form
10 is not disseminated to the public as is a 1933 Act registration state-
ment (which contains basically the same information as a Form 10, and
requires reporting under the 1934 Act by virtue of a required under-
taking), n 5 it does not seem appropriate to ignore the recommendation
of the Wheat Report that there be a six-month waiting period when the
registration is on Form 10.116 This seems inconsistent with the opening
lines of rule 144(a)(3): "[t]here is publicly available reasonably current
and informative information about . . . the issuer." The fact that a
Form 10 appears in the Commission's public files and is not dissemi-
nated to the public when combined with the fact that it becomes
automatically effective in sixty days, often before any response has been
received from the staff or comments made in response thereto, seems
to compel the conclusion that there should be some waiting period dur-
ing which the Form 10 can be seen by the public, the staff may comment
and its comments may be responded to.
(15) The holding period in rule 144(a)(1)(A) applies to all securi-
ties covered by the rule, not just restricted securities. Since the rule
covers all securities acquired by affiliates,117 the holding period applies
to securities acquired by controlling persons in the open market. No
113 See proposed rule 144(a)(1)(D).
114 Tam "WVnEAT REPORT 179. Like rule 144 the proposal simply allowed rule 154-type
sales to noncontroUing persons after a certain holding period, with a condition that the
issuer be a going concern, and did nothing to solve the question of when securities became
unrestricted once and for all.
115 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1964).
116 The Wheat Report rules would provide no waiting period where the issuer is
required to file reports by virtue of the section 15(d) undertaking in a 1933 Act registration
statement.
117 "[S]ecurities .. .which the affiliate has acquired directly or indirectly from such
issuer or otherwise .... " Proposed rule 144(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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holding period with respect to unrestricted securities was required by
rule 154 or the Wheat Report rules.118 The only purpose of a holding
period is to prevent the use of private placements by the issuer as
conduits for the sale of securities to the public. Rule 144(a)(1)(A)
treats restricted and unrestricted securities as fungible for purposes of
imposition of a holding period, notwithstanding the statement of the
Commission that the fungibility theory has been abandoned.
(16) Rule 144 is merely a "presumption". 119 Whether the pre-
sumption established by the rule is rebuttable or conclusive is not
stated. Assuming it is rebuttable, the effect of the presumption is
merely to cast the burden of proof on the person who wishes to rebut
the presumption (the Commission or a private plaintiff). If a private
plaintiff can demonstrate that the issuer's current public information
was inaccurate or was not timely filed or that there was a subsequent
public offering which, when integrated with the sale permitted by the
rule, constituted the seller an underwriter, he may be able to rebut the
presumption and destroy the exemption provided by the rule to the
unwilling seller. This is not the solution to the search for certainty
and, as a practical matter, casts the burden on the seller and his broker.
The "be presumed to" language should be eliminated wherever it
appears in rule 144.
(17) Rule 144(a)(3) does not preserve the objective concept of
qualified issuer contained in the Wheat Report and the 160 Series. The
reporting issuer must actually file the required reports to qualify
under rule 144. A noncontrolling person who holds restricted securities
and his broker 120 will have a difficult time determining the inside
information necessary to determine whether a Form 8-K must be filed,
or to determine whether a report filed met all the requirements of the
Form. As to non-reporting companies, the noncontrolling person may
be uncertain that the current public information is correct. Yet, the
rule has the practical effect of either placing the burden on the seller
and his broker with respect to these matters or requiring them to act
at their peril in the hope that the issuer has filed or published the
118 THE WHEAT REPORT 230-31. But see note 55 and accompanying text supra.
119 Proposed rule 144(a) & (a)(3).
120 See note 110 and accompanying text supra. Liability of issuers for filing defective
reports or failing to file required reports might possibly extend to the holder of a restricted
security who is prevented thereby from selling under proposed rule 144. A venture capital
investor would be well advised to insert a provision in the purchase agreement requiring
the issuer to register under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 upon request, to file all
required reports thereunder and to indemnify the investor and his broker against liabili-
ties arising from sales made while reports filed were defective. See 25 Bus. LAw. 1008, 1036
(1970).
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required current public information. Accordingly, rule 144(a)(3)
should be revised to eliminate the requirement that the issuer "does
file" reports and require only that the issuer be required to file reports
under section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. As to non-reporting
issuers, the nebulous requirement that the issuer publish "material
information ... in regard to the issuer's business and management"
should be deleted and specific information should be required. It is
recommended that the material information required by items 7, 8, 9
and 10 of Schedule I to Form 1-A set forth in Regulation A be re-
quired to be published as of a date within a certain number of months
prior to the offering under the rule. This would eliminate doubt as
to what information is material and would key the information to
certain items of Regulation A which is appropriate for small issues by
non-reporting issuers. The proposal also eliminates the apparent re-
quirement of rule 144 that the information be kept up to date down
to the date of the offering.
CONCLUSION
The search for certainty has been difficult. It seems evident that
rule 144 will require either a major revision in order to provide the
necessary certainty or will have to be abandoned in favor of the more
certain concepts embodied in the Wheat Report proposals and the 160
Series. Certain concepts embodied in rule 144 are worth salvaging and
should be incorporated into the 160 Series. Rule 144 has served the
purpose of producing a reexamination of the impact of the 160 Series
upon small issuers, venture capitalists and upon the Commission itself.
Out of the conflict and debate which ensued, much has been learned
which should now be reflected in a few substantive additions to and
changes of the 160 Series.
As the economy finds its way back to the level of infusion of
venture capital into small business characteristic of the period during
which the Disclosure Policy Study was being conducted, the need for
certainty in the area of disposition of restricted securities will become
even more urgent.' 21 It has been over two years since the Wheat Report
121 The alternative to adoption of rules of certain application as to disposition of
restricted securities in the absence of registration is to adopt simplified, less expensive and
less burdensome registration procedures. Form S-16, adopted in SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5117 (Dec. 23, 1970), is a major step toward the implementation of this alternative
solution. However, its use is limited to securities of issuers which meet the requirements of
Form 8-7 which requires the issuer to have been a reporting company for three fiscal years,
and to have had a net income of at least $500,000 for each of the last five fiscal years. The
form also requires a majority of the directors of the issuer to have been in office for the
last three fiscal years, and imposes certain other conditions. In addition, the primary use
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was published and it now seems appropriate that the Commission take
affirmative action to adopt such changed 160 Series of rules.
of Form S-16 is limited to securities of issuers whose securities are listed on a national
securities exchange, see Form S-16, general instruction A(a)(1). If Form S-16 were the sole
method by which restricted securities could be sold in the absence of full registration on
Form S-1, it would conflict with the concern of the Commission for the ability of small
companies to raise capital, see note 75 and accompanying text supra. Accordingly, rules with
respect to the disposition of restricted securities in the absence of registration are still
necessary.
